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ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ASPECTS
OF THE PLLRC REPORT
Edward W. Clyde*

I

have the background to see the overall problems in
administrative law that Mr. Bloomenthal does. He obviously
has worked a great deal in this field, and I'm sure you will
be impressed by his paper when you see the very great amount
of work and the good work he has done. I agree that the failure
in the administrative law area in administration of public
lands is to a major extent the fault of Congress. I say this, because the fabric of what is our present resource law was woven
one hundred years ago when our national goals were different
from what they are now. We had a frontier-we wanted to
get the frontier settled. We wanted to develop and subdue, and
to accomplish those goals we made our public lands available
to those willing to use them. The laws were intended to accomplish production. The United States Supreme Court saw a
natural justice in awarding federally owned resources to the
individual who first identified with the resource by expending
his time and money in its development.' Authors like Lindley
on Mines talked about our natural resource law being the result of the economic forces which created it. 2 Our national
DON'T

Attorney at Law, Salt Lake City, Utah; B.S., 1939, Brigham Young University; J.D., 1942, University of Utah; Member of the Salt Lake, Utah, and
American Bar Associations. Mr. Clyde is Chairman of the Water Law
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1. Atkinson v. Peterson, 87 U.S. (Wall.) 507, 512 (1874)
The government, by its silent acquiescence, assented to the
general occupation of the public lands for mining, and, to encourage
their free and unlimited use for that purpose, reserved such lands
as were mineral from sale and the acquisition of title by settlement.
And he who first connects his own labor with property thus situated
and open to general exploration, does, in natural justice, acquire a
better right to its use and enjoyment than others who have not given
such labor.
2. 1 LINDLEY ON MINEs 57 (3d. Ed. 1914).
*
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goals are changing, but Congress hasn't looked at some of our
resource law for a long time. In the absence of congressional
action, administrative agencies are reacting to the pressures
for change. The agencies don't appear to agree that the law
should give relatively free access nor title to the public lands
for mining and other purposes, nor that the law should favor
full and unrestricted economic use. If such was the intent of
Congress when it passed the many public land laws approximately 100 years ago, it is being frustrated by the administrative agencies today.
Since it does appear that our national goals are changing,
Congress should re-examine our goals, and adopt public land
laws which will accomplish them. Then administrative procedures should be set up which will implement and accomplish
the goals set by Congress.
My own experience with administrative agencies, both as
a member of one for four years, and as a practicing attorney
before many, has convinced me that Mr. Bloomenthal is correct in his observation that we should not try to develop every
principle and make every decision by pre-determined rules.
In some areas I think we can have clear-cut rules, but in others
the law has to be developed step by step as each new fact situation arises.
The problem requires that we recognize that there are different types of administrative procedures. We first have to
recognize that as to the public lands, two different interests
or powers are involved. One involves the powers of the federal
government as a sovereign government, and the other the
powers of federal government as the proprietary owner of the
federal land.'
3. In Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272 (1954) the court said:
[In] United States v. Gratiot, 14 Pet. 526, 537: The power of
Congress to dispose of any kind of property belonging to the United
States "is vested in Congress without limitation." United States
v. Midwest Oil Company, 236 U.S. 459, 474: "For it must be borne
in mind that Congress not only has legislative power over the public
domain, but it also exercise the powers of the proprietor therein.
Congress 'may deal with such lands precisely as private individual
may deal with his farming property. It may sell or withhold them
from sale.' Camfield v. United States 167 U.S. 524; Light v. United
States, 220 U.S. 536." United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16,
29-30: ... The power over the public land thus entrusted to Con-
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Where the government is merely exercising its powers as
a proprietary owner to elect to retain and manage or to elect to
dispose of its property, its powers, when exercised by Congress,
are probably very broad, and almost unrestricted.
This morning Public Land Law Commission Recommendation No. 23 was noted. This is a recommendation that Congress should authorize and require public land agencies to
condition the granting of rights or privileges to the public
lands on compliance with applicable environmental control
measures. This is a power Congress could exercise solely because it is the proprietary owner. When I was a member of
the State Land Board of the State of Utah, we endeavored to
get many controls of this type in the document granting rights
to use state land. The federal government, in its position as
the landlord, is inserting clauses in its mineral leases when
they are renewed.
In the decision of the Secretary of the Interior in the
Montana Power Conpany case,4 decided on December 3, 1965,
this was extended to a situation where the federal government
owned the mineral rights, but did not own the surface. The
surface rights were held by Northern Pacific Railway Company, which was the assignor of the coal lease. According to
the appellants, Northern Pacific had waived restoration of
the surface. Nevertheless, the Bureau of Land Management
required restoration, and this was one of the main grounds
for the appeal. In upholding the insertion of the restoration
clause, the decision states:
The appellant stresses that the Northern Pacific
Railway has no interest in the restoration of the surface. It contends that the restoration provision
should be limited to acreage, the surface of which is
owned by the United States. Although it is true that
the United States has a greater interest in its own
lands, it also has a substantial concern with the lands
of others in which it has reserved the minerals, together with the right to prospect for, mine and remove
the minerals. Furthermore, by the end of the twentygress is without limitations. 'And it is not for the courts to say how
that trust shall be administered.'
4. 73 INTERIOR DEC. 518 (1965).
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year lease terms, the ownership of the surface of the
land may well have changed, and the new owners may
have a different attitude from the railroad's.
Thus, where the state or the federal government still owns
and controls the minerals or the right to renegotiate leases,
they can require restoration of the surface and preservation
of aesthetic values a sa contract provision of the lease. Here
then we are not concerned with the question of power but with
policy.
It might be interesting to note one additional example of
the control which the federal government is exercising. The
Bureau of Reclamation is constructing a water project in Utah
known as th Central Utah Project. There is a contract between
the United States and a water conservancy district, under the
terms of which the government will finance and build the project, and the District will receive the water and repay various
costs. The federal government, which is furnishing the money
and will hold title to the project, at least until the money is repaid, has used the fact that it is funding the project to establish
contractual controls. The first water contract presented to the
district had a clause in it that the government could withhold
the water from the district, if the district delivered the water
to customers who were violating anti-pollution laws. As attorney for the district, I objected to this, because out of the
thousands of customers getting water, we might have only one
violator. The government ultimately agreed to change the contract, so that it now can prohibt the district from delivering
water to anyone violating the laws. But here is a use, you see,
of federal funding to accomplish a federal goal-to protect
the environment.
While Congress has by a great variety of statutes provided
for the disposal, management and access to the federal lands,
nearly all of these statutes involve administrative action. Any
discussion of the functions of an administrative agency requires a recognition that there are several kinds of administrative actions. Regulations may be promulgated pursuant to
a specific delegation of legislative power, and in prescribing
the regulation, the administrative agency, within designated
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol6/iss1/24
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limits, would actually be making or prescribing what the law
will be. The problem here is not one of judicial due process.
The legislature itself can adopt statutes without notice or
hearing. When Congress delegates such powers to an administrative agency, it normally would do so with adequate guidelines to assure that the congressional intent would be carried
into effect. Any regulation or rule adopted by the administrative agency to fill in the details of the law should, of course,
operate only in the future.' Citizen's advisory boards, public
hearings and other traditional methods for investigating the
problem and its solutions might be desirable, and Congress
might well require them as a condition to the delegation of the
legislative power, but constitutional concepts of judicial due
process would not be involved.
An administrative order or regulation might be interpretative in nature. In this type of situation Congress has itself
prescribed the law. If the Bureau of Land Management were
to promulgate rules interpreting the law, it would be nothing
more than an administrative guess at a judicial question.'
If the administrative construction of an act of Congress were
erroneous, it should not be given any weight. To do so would in
effect permit the administrative agency to amend the statute,
and construction should not be substituted for legislation.7
Thus, an administrative regulation which is contrary to the
statutory provision is a nullity,' and the rights go back to the
antecedent statute, and in this sense are retroactive in point
of time to the invalid regulation.
In Kern River Co. v. United States,9 the Secretary of the
Interior had granted a permit, pursuant to a federal statute,
5. Arizona Groc. Co. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 284 U.S. 370, 389 (1931).
The Commission's error arose from a failure to recognize that,
when it prescribed a maximum reasonable rate for the future, it
was performing a legislative function, and that, when it was sitting
to award reparation, it was sitting, for a purpose judicial in its
nature. In the second capacity, while not bound by the rule of res
judicata, it was bound to recognize the validity of the rule of conduct prescribed by it, and not to repeal its onw enactment with retroactive effect. It could repeal the order as it affected future actions
and substitute a new rule of conduct as often as occasion might require, but this was obviously the limit of its power, as of that of the
Legislative itself.
6. See, 1 VOMBAUR, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, § 487, § 490 (1942).
7. United States v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 278 U.S. 269 (1929).
8. Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129 (1936).
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for a use of the public domain to transport water. The United
States endeavored to cancel the permit on the grounds that
there had been a misrepresentation that the primary use of
the water would be for irrigation, when in fact the primary
use of was for power purposes. The District Court ruled that
the federal government had failed to prove fraud. The Supreme Court ruled that fraud had been proved, and went on to
say that if the Secretary had approved the easement with full
knowledge of the facts, then he exceeded his authority. The
U.S. Supreme Court held that the easement should be forfeited, although it had been approved by the Secretary, affirming
the Circuit Court's conclusion that if the Secretary issued a
permit with full knowledge of the fact that the water was going
to be used for power purposes, then he exceeded his statutory
authority, and his approval is void.
Another example of this type of problem was presented
to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah in Utah Hotel Co.
0 In that case an administrative
v. Industrial Commission."
proceeding had been commenced by the Industrial Commission
to require the hotel to pay unemployment taxes on salaries
paid to members of an orchestra which performed nightly at
the hotel. That administrative proceeding had been compromised bythe hotel and the Industrial Commission. The hotel
agreed to pay the taxes on the band which played there regularly, and the Industrial Commission agreed to waive the tax
on name bands who performed there from time to time. A
subsequent Industrial Commission instituted a new proceeding
to force payment of the tax on the members of the "name
bands." The new Industrial Commission held that the tax
was due, and an action to review that decision was brought in
the courts. The hotel relied on the prior administrative proceeding and the settlement and ruling made therein. The Utah
Supreme Court held that the Utah statute required payment
of the tax for all the orchestra members. It further held that
in holding to the contrary the prior Industrial Commission had
erroneously interpreted the statute. The court denied the
claim of the hotel to the effect that the prior decision was a
9. 257 U.S. 147 (1921).
10. 107 Utah 24, 151 P.2d 467 (1944).
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bar to the present action, held that an administrative interpretation of a statute which is contrary to the provisions of the
statute cannot be given weight, and that the court's opinion
should be given retroactive application.
A regulation may be neither interpretative nor legislative,
but only administrative. Examples of this may be the setting
of fees to graze the public domain or fees for timber. It might
involve the B.L.M. telling livestock operators that because
of a late winter they cannot put livestock on the public range
on the 1st of May, or that because of dry weather or past overgrazing, the number to be grazed must be reduced. It may
involve rules and regulations about how to case an oil well,
or to plug an abandoned mining tunnel. I see the approval
by a state engineer of a water application as this type of administrative procedure." When an applicant applies for
water, he is not seeking adjudication that there is unappropriated water available. He is asking a regulatory agency to
determine preliminarily that there is a reasonable possibility
that a water right could be perfected. The approval or rejection, even though appealed to the courts. does not settle
water rights. The state engineer is not adjudicating rights,
but performing an executive function. 2 The applicant should
not be required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that he can do all that his application proposes. When the
state engineer approves the application, the decision is administrative, and the appeal to the courts, except for the formalities of the trial, is of the same nature.
The object of the engineers' office is to maintain
order and efficiency in the appropriation, distribution and conservation of water and to allow as much
water to be beneficially used as possible. So construed, the law provides a period of experimentation
during which ways and means may be sought to make
beneficial use of more water under the application before the rights of the parties are finally adjudicated."a
11. United States v. District Court, 121 Utah 1, 238 P.2d 1132 (1951); Tracy
v. Bullock, 4 Utah 2d 370, 294 P.2d 707 (1956) ; Anita Ditch Co. v. Turner,
389 P.2d 1018 (Wyo. 1964).
12. Tracy v. Bullock, supra note 11.
13. United States v. District Court, supra note 11.
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In this type of case when an appeal is taken to the court,
the appeal is merely an extension or an continuance of the
administrative proceedings into the appellate tribunal. This
is noted by the Wyoming court in Anita Ditch Co. v. Turner,"
where the court said:
Decisions rendered by the Board are subject to
review by the courts, and the method of appeal from
the Board to the District Court is wholly statutory,
§ 41-193 W.C. 1957. The appeal is merely a continuance of those proceedings [Boards] in an appellate
tribunal.
Another example of an executive or regulatory function
may be the spacing of wells in an oil field. If the applicant
for a particular spacing must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence under judicial rules that a particular spacing will assuredly drain the field efficiently and economically, he may
fail. In the early stage of field development definitive evidence is not available. However, when the Commission enters
its well spacing order it isn't fixing the rights of the parties
with the final binding effect of a court decision under principles of res judicata. The Commission might order wide spacing, with full knowledge that as the field is produced, additional evidence will become available, and if its ruling on the
initial petition is in error, it can change it to permit the drilling of additional wells. If it approached the problem as a
judicial procedure, placing the burdens on the applicant to
prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence once and for
all, the ability to regulate the production of the field would be
impaired. It is thus essential to recognize that the function is
regulatory-not judicial-and that the evidence necessary
to induce an agency to regulate ought not to be the same as
the evidence which might be necessary in a judicial proceeding, where the rights of the parties are to be permanently fixed.
There are some administrative regulations which
essentially judicial in nature. The determination by the
ministrative agency becomes a final determination of
rights of the parties, with the same binding effect as an

are
adthe
ad-

14. 289 P.2d 1018 (Wyo. 1964).
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judication in the courts. In non-public land fields, an example
might be an application for workmen's compensation because
of an injury resulting out of the employment, or an application
for unemployment insurance. If the application is granted or
denied, and no judicial review is initiated, the rights of the
parties become fixed. There are similar situations in the administration of public land law, such as, for example, the
denial or granting of an application for patent. In these cases
the parties involved should be accorded judicial due process,
with adequate notice and opportunity to be heard, the opportunity to subpoena evidence, etc.
One of the advantages of permitting an administrative
agency to handle these matters is that the administrative agency often has the expertise and a staff to investigate. If the
decision is based upon matters outside the record, then it would
appear that due process would require an opportunity on the
part of the applicant or respondent to react to such evidence.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that an administrative
agency ought to be able to examine matters in its own files,
and ought to be able to consider information obtained from
investigation. The court, however, concludes that the interested persons ought to be given an opportunity to rebut, explore or qualify these materials."
Finally, if there is to be a judicial review of any administrative decision, one has to determine the nature of that review.
In some cases a judicial review of an administrative action is
to be heard as a trial de novo. Generally this means that the
administrative decision is ignored, and the matter heard
anew.1 6 New Mexico has construed a statute providing for a
trial de novo in a water case in a restricted matter. In Kelly v.
Carlsbad IrrigationDistrict,7 the court considered an application to change the point of diversion for water. The state
engineer denied the application. The District Court, under a
statute providing for an appeal "de novo" considered the evidence produced before the state engineer and also heard new
15. Los Angeles & S.L.R.R. v. Pub. Utilities Comm'n, 81 Utah 286, 17 P.2d 287
(1933); Spencer v. Indus. Comm'n, 81 Utah 511, 20 P.2d 618 (1933) ; Utah
Power & Light Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 107 Utah 155, 152 P.2d 542 (1944).
16. See Eardley v. Terry, 94 Utah 367, 77 P.2d 362 (1938).
17. 71 N. M. 464, 379 P.2d 763 (1963).
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evidence. On this basis the District Court reversed the state
engineer. On appeal the Supreme Court said the review should
have been limited to questions of law, and should have been
restricted to a consideration of whether, based on the evidence
produced before the state engineer, the officer acted fraudulently, arbitrarily or capriciously. Another rule for review of
water applications is that the administrative agency should be
sustained if there is any substantial evidence to support it. 8
In Oregon, 5 the court has held that it should not substitute its judgment for the judgment of the state engineer. The
statute provided for a review in the courts to be governed by
the practice in equity suits and the court said that its review
should be limited to a determination of whether the state engineer's order was outside his authority and arbitrary.
It is thus not enough to say that there should be recourse
to the courts. Any statute ought to go further and indicate the
nature of the review.
In conclusion then, on legislative type regulations there
really is no problem of judicial due process, and there ought to
to be no need for court review, except to determine the law
question- has the power exercised been legally delegated and
properly applied? On interpretative regulations where the
statute governs, there should be a right to review the law ruling in the courts, and little or no weight should be given to the
initial guess by the administrative agency as to what Congress
intended. In administrative or executive type regulations, the
procedural requirements should be less stringent. In the judicial type determinations, where rights are finally fixed, procedural due process should be afforded, there should be a right
to appeal to the courts, and a review at least of the questions
of law and some standard given as to the extent to which the
court should review the facts.

18. City of San Antonio v. Texas Water Comm'n, 407 S. W. 752 (Tex. 1966).
19. Broughton's Estate v. Central Oregon Irr. Dist., 160 Ore. 435, 101 P.2d 425
(1940).
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